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Abstract The evolution of psychological adaptations for
cooperationisstillpuzzlingduetoatendencytoframesocial
interaction in mathematical and game-theoretical terms,
without systematically examining its causal structure and
underlying mechanisms. Complementarily, empirical
approaches to cooperation tend to focus on isolated com-
ponents of mechanisms without sufﬁciently indicating how
different componentsare combinedintoa singlemechanism
and different mechanisms ﬁt into a single organism. An
alternative approach to the evolution of cooperation is pro-
posed, starting from a description of basic physical proper-
ties of individuals and their environment, and the limited
physical or mechanistic possibilities to generate adaptive
responses to those properties. This approach reveals that
some forms of symmetrical cooperation do not require
mechanisms ‘‘speciﬁcally designed for’’ beneﬁting others,
whereaseffectivehelpingrequiresaspeciﬁcmechanismthat
relatively unconditionally and persistently responds to the
vulnerability of other individuals. Unraveling the causal
structure of different types of other-beneﬁting shows that a
mechanism for asymmetrical helping may considerably
improvesymmetricalcooperationthroughpropertiessuchas
tolerance, patience, and the human capacity to experience a
wide variety of moral emotions. The proposed mechanistic
approach to cooperation provides the mathematical/game-
theoretical approach with realistic assumptions about psy-
chological adaptations, and helps to integrate the scattered
facts aboutmechanismsgatheredby theempirical approach.
It also helps to build bridges between the two approaches by
providing a common language for thinking about psycho-
logical mechanisms.
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One of the facts that we must face about evolutionary
systems is that their simple organizational principles
can imply extraordinarily subtle properties. Indeed,
part of the dilemma that many students of mind now
face is not that they do not know enough facts on
which to base a theory, but rather they do not know
which facts are principles and which are epiphe-
nomena, and how to derive the multitudinous con-
sequences that occur when a few principles act
together (Grossberg 1980, p. 3).
Introduction
Broadly conceived, cooperation refers to organisms behav-
ing in such a way that they improve each others’ ﬁtness or
reproductive success. Biologists, psychologists, and econ-
omists attempting to identify, describe, and integrate the
psychological mechanisms underlying these behaviors, and
to explain their evolution, are faced with two major prob-
lems. First, these behaviors are extremely divers and may
be caused by both common and unique mechanisms which
may be difﬁcult to distinguish. Second, it is unclear what
realistic assumptions should be made about the general
physical or neural properties of the mechanisms one is
looking for. This paper argues that both problems are
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theoretical and empirical approach to cooperation. Fur-
thermore, it will be proposed that a fruitful evolutionary
explanation of cooperation should start with a general
consideration of how cooperation is made possible and
constrained by general physical and neural properties
of behavioral mechanisms. First consider the diversity
of behaviors and underlying mechanisms involved in
cooperation.
Cooperation may take place largely on the basis of
mechanisms involved in self-preservation such as those
that motivate and control hunting, feeding, and defense. In
many of these cases, individuals are mutually dependent in
that they can only satisfy their needs by exchanging goods
or services (e.g., ﬂowers trading their attractive nectar with
insects or birds for opportunities to distribute their pollen)
or coordinating their behavior to realize a common goal
(e.g., individuals hunting down a prey animal too large to
catch and subdue on their own). Although to an observer
these individuals sometimes may appear to behave in
‘‘nice’’, ‘‘benevolent’’, or even ‘‘altruistic’’ ways to each
other, it is likely that the underlying mechanisms are not
‘‘speciﬁcally designed’’ by evolution to provide ﬁtness
beneﬁts to others. Complementarily, given the interde-
pendencies between individuals, there also seems little
reason to expect that individuals try to refrain from coop-
erating or that some form of enforcement would be nec-
essary to prevent them from ‘‘cheating’’ (Clutton-Brock
2009; Leimar and Hammerstein 2010; Maynard Smith and
Szathmary 1995; Worden and Levin 2007).
However, some behaviors appear exclusively aimed at
improving the ﬁtness of other individuals than the actor, and
seem to be made possible by mechanisms speciﬁcally
designed for this purpose. This can be most clearly seen in
cases where recipients of beneﬁts cannot cooperate in the
above sense because they are vulnerable or needy, and lar-
gely dependent on the care and help of others. Here, bene-
ﬁting others can only be effective when benefactors are
disposed to respond relatively unconditionally and fast to
perceived need states (before the other individual’s condi-
tion deteriorates) and persist in helping until the recipient’s
situationhasimproved.Clearexamplesofthesedispositions
are the mechanisms underlying parental care which are
responsible for behaviors such as feeding, protecting, nur-
turing,andteachingoffspring.Ithasbeenarguedthatsimilar
mechanisms may be involved in helping nonkin in need
(e.g., de Waal 1996;H r d y2009) or in causing the emotions
that would motivate such behavior such as empathy or
sympathy (e.g., Batson 1987; de Waal 2008; Dijker 2001).
The mechanisms underlying cooperation are increas-
ingly difﬁcult to distinguish in situations in which mech-
anisms designed for self-preservation and other-beneﬁting
act together in complex ways. For example, in symmetrical
situations in which selﬁshness or cheating are especially
likely, and which game theorists tend to model in terms of
the prisoner’s dilemma or similar games (see below),
individuals may have to be endowed with mechanisms that
dispose them to be nice, trusting, forgiving, and tolerant for
stable patterns of cooperation to develop (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981; Caporael et al. 1989; Gintis et al. 2003;
Richerson and Boyd 2005). Furthermore, although uncon-
ditional or speedy and persistent helping may be the most
effective in providing beneﬁts to vulnerable or needy oth-
ers, this behavior may have to be tempered by distrustful or
punishing tendencies in order to establish stable patterns of
reciprocity (Trivers 1971). The latter tendencies may even
be necessary to prevent parents from being parasitized by
their offspring (Trivers 1974) or to increase the effective-
ness of certain parental behaviors (e.g., aggressive defense
of offspring).
The second problem faced by researchers trying to
uncover the mechanisms underlying cooperation is more
fundamental and relates to assumptions made about the
nature of behavioral or psychological mechanisms and the
criteria used to recognize and differentiate them. What are
the general physical properties that psychological mecha-
nisms must have to enable organisms to effectively inﬂu-
ence their environment and to be selected as adaptations?
Certainly, these mechanisms should promote inclusive ﬁt-
ness in the long run. But not all conceivable behavioral
adaptations seem equally possible, while certain physical
properties of adaptive mechanisms seem mandatory. As the
above examples suggest, adaptive psychological mecha-
nisms rely on accurate perception or internal representation
of certain ﬁtness-relevant properties of other individuals
(e.g., their capacity to provide food or safety, their vul-
nerability or need for protection), motivational properties
associated with the reactivity, intensity, persistence, and
improvement of behavior, and a particular organization
allowing different mechanisms to compete or act together.
In addition to effectiveness, they must also allow for
selectivity in providing beneﬁts (e.g., on the basis of
learned attitudes toward more or less ‘‘deserving’’ recipi-
ents of beneﬁts), as is required by genetic cost-beneﬁt
models such as kin selection (Hamilton 1964) or reciprocal
altruism (Trivers 1971). We have to assume that all these
properties of relevant psychological mechanisms heavily
rely on using neurons—evolution’s most successful
behavioral invention—as building blocks.
Unfortunately, the enormously inﬂuential mathematical
and game-theoretical approach to cooperation (for reviews
and general discussions, see Gardner and Foster 2008;
Lehmann and Keller 2006; Nowak 2006; West et al. 2007)
makes it easy to forget that psychological mechanisms are
physical adaptations to a physical environment; whether
mental events mediate their behavioral output or not. This
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mechanisms but ‘‘choice strategies’’ of nonphysical players
confronted with a payoff matrix containing values repre-
senting ﬁtness costs and beneﬁts. Its goal is to demonstrate
(with mathematical proof or computer simulation) that
games have particular solutions, termed Nash equilibria or
evolutionarily stable strategies; cells of the payoff matrix
representing choices that are best for each player and to
which the choices of rational players will converge (for a
general treatment, see Binmore 2007a, b). In the next
section it is illustrated with a game such as the prisoner’s
dilemma how difﬁcult it is to establish solely in terms of a
game-theoretical approach to what behaviors, let alone
underlying mechanisms, choosing rows or columns of a
payoff matrix refers. This ambiguity may be partially
responsible for the continuing controversies surrounding
the deﬁnition (West et al. 2007) and evolution of cooper-
ation (Okasha 2010).
The concept of mechanism is also unclearly used in the
more empirical approach to cooperation which tries to
identify behavioral or psychological mechanisms involved
in cooperation on the basis of systematic observations and
experiments on real animals (for recent reviews and dis-
cussions, see Brosnan et al. 2010; de Waal and Suchak
2010). This approach concentrates on the apparent com-
ponents of underlying mechanisms; yet, without sufﬁ-
ciently indicating how different components are combined
into a single mechanism and different mechanisms ﬁt into a
single organism. The long list of mechanistic aspects now
thought to be involved in cooperation include references
to, for example, cheater detection, empathy, learning,
memory, conscience, hormones such as oxytocin, mirror
neurons, brain areas (e.g., prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and
pleasure or reward center), and a wide variety of mental
states (e.g., guilt, sympathy, moral anger) reported by
human research participants themselves. In parallel to these
references, cognitive psychologists tend to describe psy-
chological mechanisms as sets of instructions or computer
programs prescribing how to combine symbols in order to
arrive at new symbols or ‘‘conclusions’’; a process com-
monly referred to as information processing or computa-
tion (for an inﬂuential application to evolutionary
psychology, see Cosmides and Tooby 2005; Tooby and
Cosmides 1992). However, a description of a psychological
process primarily in terms of symbol manipulation is still
far remote from a description of true mechanisms with
causal and lawful properties (Bechtel and Abrahamsen
2005; Bunge and Ardilla 1987; Sterelny 1990).
Bshary and Bergmu ¨ller (2008) recently made the
important observation that in the game-theoretical and
psychological explanation of cooperation, the term mech-
anism has a different meaning. However, they are not clear
about the meaning of the term psychological mechanism.
For example, they distinguish between ‘‘physiological’’
(oxytocin, brain stimulation) and ‘‘psychological’’ mecha-
nisms (e.g., guilt, pleasure) and contrast these with par-
ticular brain structures that would provide the ‘‘conditions’’
for the former two. Yet, from a psychological perspective
this is unsatisfactory as a coherent description of a psy-
chological mechanism must be able to integrate neural,
physiological, and mental aspects (Bunge and Ardilla
1987). Furthermore, it is also unclear how one should
translate choice strategies, the ‘‘mechanisms’’ of game
theory, into psychological mechanisms and vice versa.
It should ﬁnally be noted that several cooperation
researchers working in the game-theoretical tradition
have expressed concerns about ‘‘cognitive constraints’’ on
the capability of individuals to engage in cooperation or
reciprocity (Bshary and Bergmu ¨ller 2008; Hagen and
Hammerstein 2006; Stevens et al. 2005). However, what
they usually mean is that game-playing individuals some-
times can only reach particular equilibria when they have
sufﬁcient capacity to memorize the previous row or column
choices made by themselves and other players, and hence
can engage in ‘‘book keeping’’. To what extent these
constraints are important in social relationships that are not
easily modeled in terms of game theory, is unclear (cf. Silk
2003).
The goal of this paper is to show that a description of the
basic properties of adaptive psychological mechanisms and
a classiﬁcation of mechanisms involved in cooperation
may considerably improve our understanding of how
cooperation and its evolution are constrained by what is
physically or neurally possible. Hopefully, adopting a
common language for describing behavioral or psycho-
logical mechanisms also contributes to bridging the gap
between the mathematical/game-theoretical and empirical
approach to cooperation.
This paper will not provide detailed descriptions of
cooperation in different species or attempt to reconstruct
the different routes taken by evolution. Instead, it will
focus on general characteristics and broad classes of
cooperation and other-beneﬁting. However, it will espe-
cially pay attention to cooperation in humans, for two
different reasons. First, many theorists believe that humans
are exceptionally good at cooperating, and assume that this
is made possible by uniquely human psychological adap-
tations, associated with properties such as morality, con-
science, and tolerance. Yet, an integrative mechanistic
description of these qualities is still wanting.
A second reason for paying special attention to human
cooperation is that a better understanding of uniquely
human psychological adaptations will allow us to better
differentiate them from the ‘‘more primitive’’ mechanisms
that may be responsible for cooperation in many nonhuman
animals. Theories of how the human mind works are often
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in nonhuman animals. However, an understanding of
what the human mind uniquely contributes to coopera-
tion may reveal that ‘‘more primitive’’ psychological
mechanisms may be sufﬁcient to cause cooperation in
nonhuman animals. At the same time, this awareness
may help to appreciate that human cooperation still
depends on similar elementary mechanisms and may only
appear to be determined by uniquely human mental states
and processes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After the
next section has explained how important it is to distin-
guish between asymmetrical and symmetrical forms of
other-beneﬁting (i.e., between helping and cooperation), a
subsequent section will describe the basic properties of
adaptive behavioral and psychological mechanisms. This
mechanistic framework will be used to describe in two
subsequent sections how mechanisms associated with self-
preservation and other-beneﬁting are involved in helping
and cooperation, respectively. The section on helping
proposes that a speciﬁcally designed psychological mech-
anism for effective helping (a) is likely to evolve in the
context of parent-offspring relationships; (b) acts together
with self-preservational mechanisms and acquired attitudes
to guarantee selectivity in helping; (c) contributes to the
explanation of sympathy, an elusive motivational state
generally considered to be the most important mediating
cause of helping in humans, as well as other moral emo-
tions such as moral anger, and guilt; and (d) is differen-
tially developed or activated in different individuals and
cultures, accounting for important individual and cultural
differences in sociality and morality. In the section on
cooperation, the mechanisms involved in other-beneﬁting
will be classiﬁed, and it will be illustrated how different
psychological mechanisms for self-preservation may be
combined to improve cooperation. It will also be shown
how a mechanism designed for relatively unconditional
helping may improve cooperation in highly autonomous
agents such as humans, accounting for properties that can
be described as morality, conscience, and tolerance. It is
ﬁnally examined how human evolution has resulted in a
parental care mechanism that, supplied with the right per-
ceptual input, can be activated in all individuals, in females
as well as males, and in children as well as adults; thereby
providing the foundation for a care-based morality.
The Distinction Between Helping and Cooperation
A precondition for distinguishing the different psycholog-
ical mechanisms that produce behaviors involved in ben-
eﬁting others is a clear description of the behaviors that are
presumably brought forward by these mechanisms. As will
become evident in the rest of this paper, one crucial but
generally ignored distinction is that between behaviors
involved in helping and cooperation. In the social sciences,
helping and cooperation tend to be studied in relatively
independent research areas, and for good reasons. Consis-
tent with the everyday meaning of the term, social psy-
chologists assume that helping typically takes place in an
asymmetrical relationship between individuals in which
helping behavior is causally determined by the perception
of another individual’s vulnerability or need, and the
behavior is produced in a timely manner and stops after the
recipient’s need state has been reduced. This does not deny
the inﬂuence of a host of other factors on helping such as
characteristics of the recipient, the presence of bystanders,
or utilitarian motives (for reviews, see Batson 1998;d e
Waal 2008; Penner et al. 2005).
In contrast, and also consistent with its common meaning
(see Tuomela 2000), cooperation refers to a symmetrical
relationship in which individuals mutually provide beneﬁts
to each other or work together in realizing a common goal
(for reviews, see Fehr and Ga ¨chter 2000; Hammerstein
2003b; Kollock 1998). Importantly, cooperation is normally
assumed to take place among not particularly needy indi-
viduals; at least, not that needy that providing beneﬁts pri-
marily would be determined by the perception of another’s
need (in which case it would be helping). Indeed, a needy
recipient of help may not be capable of cooperating in the
above sense. As will become evident in a later section,
matters are more complex because cooperation sometimes
refers to reciprocal helping.
Theorists interested in the evolutionary explanation of
other-beneﬁting behavior often use the terms cooperation
and helping interchangeably. This is unfortunate because
one then runs the risk of missing an important physical and
neural constraint on the evolution of the mechanism
responsible for helping behavior. In particular, one has to
assume that in order to help others effectively, a recipient
must be capable of causing that behavior in the benefactor;
by ‘‘unconditionally’’ activating a reactive sensorimotor or
motivational mechanism that produces motor output in a
timely, relevant, and persistent manner. It will later be
argued that a mechanism for effective helping is most
likely to evolve in parent-offspring relationships.
In contrast, cooperation is made possible by a wide
variety of mechanisms involved in self-preservation (not to
be confused with ‘‘selﬁshness’’), although some appear to
be ‘‘nice’’ or ‘‘speciﬁcally designed’’ to beneﬁt or help
others. Importantly, a mechanism speciﬁcally designed for
asymmetrical helping may come to play a less obvious role
in cooperation, but this is difﬁcult to see if that mechanism
is not ﬁrst clearly described.
Especially in the context of game theory, cooperation
and helping are difﬁcult to distinguish in terms of their
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theorists to clearly distinguish them. For example, in the
prisoner’s dilemma, ‘‘cooperation’’ refers to choosing a
column or row of a payoff matrix which, independently of
what the other player does, is associated with obtaining the
least beneﬁts for oneself, yet a reasonable beneﬁt if the
other player would make the same choice (Kollock 1998).
One class of explanations explains ‘‘cooperation’’ in terms
of the unattractiveness of choosing the ‘‘defect’’ option; for
example, by assuming the presence of psychological
mechanisms that generate fear of punishment and allow for
accurate detection of defectors or cheaters. Another class of
explanations centers around the attractiveness of choosing
the row or column labeled ‘‘cooperate’’. Although this
choice may be explained in terms of self-interested insight
(‘‘in the long run, we both will be better off if we choose to
cooperate’’) or other self-interested motives (‘‘to cooperate
will help to establish a good reputation in the eyes of the
other player or bystanders’’), it has also been proposed that
it may be caused by a mechanism ‘‘speciﬁcally designed
for’’ beneﬁting or helping others in an asymmetrical
way; a mechanism referred to with terms such as niceness,
benevolence, other-regarding sentiments,o raltruism
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Caporael et al. 1989; Gintis
et al. 2003; Richerson and Boyd 2005).
Both classes of explanations have also been combined
into descriptions of more complex play strategies that are
adopted when the prisoner’s dilemma is played repeatedly,
of which the most famous is tit-for-tat. This strategy
assumes that players have a ‘‘nice’’ disposition that causes
them to start with a cooperative move, and to subsequently
copy the choice made by the other player, thus allowing for
both punishment in case the other defects and forgiveness
after the other changes from defection to cooperation
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).
The problem to be noted here is that it is difﬁcult to
determine the validity of these and other explanations as
long as cooperation is not clearly deﬁned in terms of its
behavioral and causal structure. As mentioned earlier, there
is nothing particularly benevolent or nice about many
forms of cooperation. Furthermore, in the context of the
prisoner’s dilemma, it is also difﬁcult to see how a player
can induce helping by exposing a ‘‘nice’’ player physically
to a strong need state or by begging. Similarly, it is difﬁcult
to relate game behavior to psychological mechanisms
associated with power. That is, one must assume that the
use of power to enforce cooperation can only work when
benefactor and recipient have complementary sensorimotor
or psychological mechanisms that can be mutually acti-
vated during the interaction; in such a way that a powerful
individual can induce, by signaling physical strength or the
potential to inﬂict harm, a submissive and perhaps fearful
individual to provide a beneﬁt. Indeed, such direct causal
inﬂuences would violate the very principles of game theory
which require, among other things, that players make their
choices independently and strictly on the basis of infor-
mation about previous or expected choices of the other
player, given the particular payoff matrix (Binmore 2007a;
von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Of course, a payoff
matrix may be constructed to represent a particular causal
dependency among players and potentials for causal
inﬂuence. Yet, the way players inﬂuence each other is not
determined by physical properties that can be perceived
while making choices. When economists and psychologists
require humans to actually play the games developed by
this approach, they similarly allow players to exert as little
direct physical inﬂuence on each other as possible (Fehr
and Ga ¨chter 2000; Hammerstein 2003b; Kollock 1998;
exceptions are discussed later).
To avoid confusion, this paper uses the general term
other-beneﬁting to refer to all behaviors that cause an
increase in ﬁtness of other individuals than the actor;
irrespective of the particular ﬁtness costs to the benefactor
and hence the altruistic nature of the act; and irrespective
of the ‘‘design’’ and goals of the underlying mechanisms.
At the same time, it is recognized that different kinds of
other-beneﬁting such as helping needy others or coopera-
tion in the narrow sense of working together may be
associated with different behavioral mechanisms which
may have a different evolutionary origin. Before explaining
this, it is important to be clear about the basic concepts that
are used to describe behavioral or psychological mecha-
nisms and their functioning.
Physical Mechanisms for Behavioral Adaptation
to Physical Properties
An important point about evolution that tends to be
obscured by a strong focus on genetic cost-beneﬁt model-
ing or isolated aspects of underlying mechanisms, or by
describing mechanisms primarily in terms of ‘‘information
processing’’, is that natural selection works on the physical
or material properties of living objects, whether we are
dealing with global bodily features, particular organs, or
neural mechanisms generating and controlling behaviors
that inﬂuence the environment. Only when physical prop-
erties of bodies and mechanisms allow organisms to
effectively adapt to certain physical properties of the
world, will they help to promote reproductive success and
phylogenetic adaptation. An emphasis on physical prop-
erties of individuals and their environment reminds us that,
in addition to ‘‘designing’’ adaptations, evolution must also
‘‘construct’’ adaptations on the basis of a limited number of
physical possibilities to do so.
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The general problem of the genes and evolution in
‘‘designing’’ and ‘‘constructing’’ individual bodies with
adaptive properties can be analyzed in terms of three
subproblems of adaptation: Self-preservation, reproduc-
tion, and beneﬁting certain other individuals than the actor
(cf. Dawkins 1976/1989). Self-preservation refers to the
problem that genes and the organisms they code for should
have some stability or longevity. At the very least, they
should live long enough to replicate successfully. This
implies, among other things, that organisms should have
adaptive physical and behavioral properties that help them
to ﬁnd and consume food (prey), and to prevent contact
with other organisms that have the same goal (predators).
Reproduction in its sexual form requires ﬁnding a suitable
mate. At a minimum, this mate should have ‘‘good’’ or
‘‘healthy’’ genes that help to code for properties that
increase the chances of the new combinations of genes, and
the offspring they code for, to self-preserve and reproduce.
Finally, other-beneﬁting refers to the problem of not letting
self-preservation goals prevail during contact with organ-
isms carrying copies of one’s genes, such as the products of
previous reproduction (offspring) and other kin. That is, kin
should not be eaten and not be damaged in the process of
defending oneself against their self-preservation needs. In
addition, other-beneﬁting should result in properties that
help promote the self-preservation and reproductive suc-
cess of offspring and other kin. At least in relation to off-
spring, effective other-beneﬁting behavior may directly
promote parents’ reproductive success and therefore
requires mechanisms that are ‘‘speciﬁcally designed and
constructed’’ to generate that behavior.
The three classes of adaptive behavioral mechanisms
each respond to a particular class of properties of objects.
Mechanisms associated with self-preservation have to
respond to properties such as the dangerousness and con-
trollability of predators, or edibility of food. Mechanisms
relevant for reproduction should respond to properties
associated with sexual receptivity and potential contribu-
tion to the ﬁtness of offspring. Of special interest in this
paper is the main property of objects to which a behavioral
mechanism devoted to other-beneﬁting should respond:
Vulnerability. In the case of living things, vulnerability
refers to the likelihood or disposition of individuals to
change into a state of decreased ﬁtness, inconsistent with
their ‘‘design speciﬁcations’’, when exposed to certain
conditions (e.g., strong outward forces causing deformation
or disintegration). Examples of cues associated with vul-
nerability are relatively small size, transparency or light
color indicating relatively small mass or brittleness and,
when in motion, relatively less potential force would the
object impact on another object with more mass and/or
counter force. Opposite to vulnerability is physical strength
and potential force, causing relatively vulnerable objects to
deform or disintegrate upon collision or handling. Indi-
viduals concerned with preventing this from happening
should be expected to relate vulnerability and physical
strength in complementary ways to each other. For exam-
ple, behavior that takes into account an object’s vulnera-
bility may consist of protecting the object against strong
outward forces, and applying just enough force to gentle
handle or manipulate it in goal-relevant ways (Dijker 2008;
Gorniak et al. 2009).
In general, effectively responding to ﬁtness-relevant
properties requires that behavior is determined by the
accurate perception of these properties. A basic problem,
however, is that an object’s properties cannot be directly
perceived on the basis of sensory input alone. After all, a
property is a disposition of an object to change from one
state into another when the object is exposed to certain
conditions. Hence, a property can only be discovered
through inﬂuencing the object and observing the conse-
quences, which may result in a representation of, or
memory for, the property in terms of an ‘‘if–then’’ rela-
tionship. For example, an object’s vulnerability can be
internally represented by the expectancy that the object will
be deformed or break when manipulated in certain ways,
and its heaviness by the expectancy that a particular
intensity of motor output or force is needed to overcome
gravitational force.
In early organisms, accurate perception and adaptive
behavior were one and the same thing. That is, these
organisms acquired simple reactive sensorimotor mecha-
nisms of which the sensors started to activate effectors at
the moment they were activated by particular input stimuli
that were reliably correlated with ﬁtness-relevant proper-
ties. The nerve cell or neuron connecting a simple sensor to
an effector has proven evolution’s most successful tool to
build these adaptive mechanisms.
Consider, for example, a neuron that connects light-
sensitive cells to effector cells (e.g., the muscle cells of a
ﬂipper) so that behavioral output is directly caused and
directed when the sensors receive relevant input. When the
light-sensitive cells are stimulated by a light source and
light is correlated with the presence of food or the right
temperature, a simple sensorimotor mechanism may evolve
that causes the organism to swim toward the light source
(i.e., ‘‘motivates’’ the organism to produce motor activity
until a certain endstate or goal has been realized). The more
reliable the correlation, the more the neural mechanism or
disposition contributes to the organism’s ﬁtness and to
preserving its genetic code for future generations.
By increasing the number of neurons involved in linking
sensors to effectors, and by varying the connection
strengths between them, the organism may acquire the
Evol Biol (2011) 38:124–143 129
123capacity to engage in one of the most elementary forms of
learning, thereby improving its performance during its
lifetime. In particular, through classical conditioning, new
or conditioned stimuli, originally not able to do so, may
gain the causal potential to activate the mechanism, thus
increasingly allowing the organism to respond in an
anticipatory fashion (e.g., arriving at the food location
before food becomes available).
Behavioral adaptation will be further improved by a
neural network structure in which sensorimotor mecha-
nisms performing different kinds of functions are allowed
to function relatively competitively or independently from
one another through mutual inhibition, thus resulting in a
process similar to decision making (Grossberg 1980;
Ludlow 1980). For example, it would be adaptive that a
system for seeking food near a light source competes with a
system speciﬁcally responding to stimuli associated with
the presence of predators. In this way, strong stimulation of
the latter system can inhibit food seeking behavior and
induce the organism to change to an escape mode in order
to avoid being eaten.
However, a greater improvement in the organism’s
capacity to produce adaptive behavior will occur when the
neurons mediating sensors and effectors can form
increasingly accurate and stable internal representations of
objects and their invariant properties. The general way in
which neural networks or brains can do this is by changing
the connection strengths between neurons on the basis of
sensory feedback about the consequences of the organism’s
own behavior; a learning process (operant conditioning)
resulting in the formation of sensorimotor networks that
represent correlations between sensory and motor activity
or what-leads-to-what expectancies. Many theorists assume
that it is through these kinds of internal representations that
the brain is capable of perceiving invariant or constant
properties of the environment (Gregory 2005; Grossberg
1980; Helmholtz 1878; Jeannerod 1994; O’Regan and Noe ¨
2001; Shepard 1989; Sommerhoff 1974). For instance,
whereas light rays in the above example are cues that can
unconditionally trigger the behavioral mechanism, and the
reactive mechanism ‘‘motivates’’ behavior, interaction
with, or manipulation of, objects present at the location of
the light source may reveal to what extent these objects are
edible when manipulated in a particular manner.
A complementary way to view the combined activation
of sensorimotor or motivational systems and internal rep-
resentations of properties that mediate between sensors and
effectors is to see them as motivational states or emotions
that continue to drive and control behavioral output when
sensory stimulation is interrupted (Bindra 1985; Grossberg
1980; Lewis 2005; Toates 1986). Because these states
allow organisms to ﬁne-tune their behavior to objective
properties of the world, they will result in increasingly
effective action. A similar view of the production of
adaptive behavior underlies ‘‘embodied’’ approaches to
human cognition (Clark 1999). For example, it is recog-
nized that in building robots it is necessary to start with
simple reactive mechanisms that, through learning, con-
struct increasingly elaborate and accurate internal repre-
sentations of their environment without the need of
instructions and explicit symbolic representations (e.g.,
Brooks 1997; Bryson 2000; Sloman and Chrisley 2005).
Once stable internal representation of properties is
possible, it starts to make sense to use symbols to refer to
properties in the outside world in a ‘‘truth-conserving’’
manner, as well as to refer to relationships among prop-
erties and to logically derive new ones. Probably a typi-
cally human property of brains is that they can use an
advanced symbol system (e.g., language) to describe and
think about the internally represented properties of the
world (and of the body responding to this world), and
derive new properties on the basis of reasoning and logic.
This enables humans more than any other species to con-
sider different courses of action without or before experi-
encing their (sometimes ﬁtness-reducing) consequences.
Unfortunately, it is this symbolic capacity of the human
mind that also forms the major obstacle to understanding
how brains work and how they evolve. In particular, our
own ability to describe events and properties in terms of
symbols and rules for combining symbols (e.g., language),
and to simulate processes of symbol manipulation on dig-
ital computers, have led psychologists to equate the con-
cept of psychological mechanism with a set of instructions
or computer program. This may obscure the tremendous
capacity of the brain to internally represent the world and
its properties in a quite accurate and stable manner on the
basis of highly variable sensory input, and without the use
of symbols.
A Model for Adaptive Psychological Mechanisms
In a well-adapted organism, all three ways of responding to
properties of the world and its objects are integrated. This
is illustrated in Fig. 1. At ﬁrst, an organism responds to the
properties of objects on the basis of cues or trigger stimuli
that are correlated with these properties. These cues trigger
sensorimotor or motivational systems (which compete for
expression) that generate goal-directed behavior, resulting
in changes in objects and the relationship between organ-
ism and objects. On the basis of sensory feedback from
these changes, stable internal representations of properties
and objects are formed that, together with activated moti-
vational systems, determine the motivational state of the
organism. Attitudes are internal representations of objects
that are associated with unconditioned cues that have the
potential to trigger motivational systems. Hence, activation
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systems and exerts a biasing inﬂuence on motivational
systems involved in other-beneﬁting and self-preservation.
In Fig. 1, negative attitude objects could be represented by
an excitatory connection between a represented object and
the motivational systems responsible for fear or aggression,
together with connections to negatively evaluated proper-
ties or negative expectancies. Positive attitudes could
be represented by an excitatory connection between a
represented object and a motivational system underlying
(parental) care, together with connections to positively
evaluated properties (for a similar psychological descrip-
tion of attitudes, see (Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Staats
1968). (Of course, there may be other motivational systems
that may be linked to positive attitude objects and positive
expectancies such as the ones involved in feeding and sex.)
As argued below, the biasing inﬂuence of attitudes on the
activation of motivational systems allows them to play an
important role in selectivity in other-beneﬁting behavior.
The activation thresholds of motivational systems may
also be lowered by means of priming; previous or con-
textual activation of these systems (e.g., by cues unrelated
to the current object or situation) may bias them to respond
earlier to new stimulation.
Figure 1 also suggests that the same property may be
associated with different cues. For example, the danger-
ousness of an object (P2) may be associated with its
loomingness, particular shape, or alarm calls of other
objects that are present. The vulnerability of an object may
be associated with age-related immaturity cues such as
small size and particular behavior. A situation may activate
more than one motivational system. For example, a vul-
nerable but happy child may activate a motivational system
dedicated to care, yet when it shows expressions of distress
and alarm it may also activate fear or aggression. Figure 1
shows that motivational systems, representations of prop-
erties, and attitudes are closely connected and that all
contribute to generating motivational states or emotions.
Finally, to incorporate a role for symbolic representation
and symbol manipulation in Fig. 1, imagine that the input,
output, and functioning of the mechanisms can be descri-
bed in terms of a symbol system (e.g., language) so that the
organism can ‘‘think about’’ them, and that these thoughts
sometimes also have the potential to activate motivational
systems and hence cause behavior.
Implications for Explaining Helping Behavior
The literature on helping and cooperation shows a strong
tendency to analyze other-beneﬁting in terms of selectivity;
selecting the ‘‘right’’ and rejecting the ‘‘wrong’’ or less
deserving recipient of help, or differentially investing in
the two. This aspect has been most strongly emphasized in
two inﬂuential genetic cost-beneﬁt models of social
behavior. In particular, Hamilton’s (1964) theory of kin-
selected altruism or inclusive ﬁtness proposes that, at the
level of genes, ﬁtness can be promoted by beneﬁting others
if benefactors select recipients that are sufﬁciently geneti-
cally related. Trivers (1971) argued that the evolution of a
trait for beneﬁting genetically unrelated individuals is also
possible as long as the benefactor selects recipients that are
likely to provide return beneﬁts (i.e., has a good reputation
as a reciprocator) and hence the costs of helping can be
compensated during the benefactor’s lifetime. Hence, both
models predict the evolution of psychological mechanisms
for selecting the right recipients of beneﬁts.
Unfortunately, this emphasis on selectivity has obscured
the importance of the effectiveness of helping. Using
the present mechanistic approach, it can be shown that
effectiveness depends, among other things, on behavioral
qualities such as speed, persistence, and ‘‘unconditional
kindness’’; and that these properties are made possible by
the automatic or unconditioned activation of a motivational
mechanism by cues that are correlated with the vulnera-
bility and neediness of a potential recipient of beneﬁts. In
this section, it is ﬁrst argued that a mechanism for effective
helping having these properties is especially likely to
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123evolve in the context of parent-offspring relationships
where it contributes unambiguously to reproductive suc-
cess. It is subsequently argued that unconditional helping
does not exclude selectivity and that both are made pos-
sible by letting motivational systems for unconditional
helping and self-preservation act together. In another
subsection, it is shown how a better understanding of the
mechanism underlying effective parental care helps to
clarify the nature of the elusive motivational state thought
to be centrally involved in motivating helping behavior in
humans (and perhaps in several nonhuman primates as
well): Sympathy, as well the nature of many other moral
emotions such as moral anger and guilt. Finally, it is argued
that individual and cultural differences in sociality depend
on the likelihood with which mechanisms for parental care
and self-preservation can be activated in different indi-
viduals and cultures, warning us that our explanations of
helping and morality in general are dependent on the
individuals and cultures selected for study.
Parent-Offspring Relationships as the Context
for the Evolution of a Mechanism for Effective Helping
Kin-selection or inclusive ﬁtness theory (Hamilton 1964)
not only predicts that a mechanism for effective other-
beneﬁting is especially likely to evolve in a relationship
between parents and offspring, but also in response to a
speciﬁc physical property of the recipient of help. In par-
ticular, the theory predicts that such a psychological
mechanism can evolve when degree of genetic relatedness
between benefactor and recipient is high and the ratio of
costs to benefactor and beneﬁts to recipient is relatively
small. These requirements tend to be satisﬁed for parents
providing beneﬁts that are both extremely beneﬁcial to
vulnerable offspring and of little costs to the benefactor.
The key determinant of such a small cost-beneﬁt ratio
would be a capacity of parents to accurately perceive and
appropriately respond to the property of vulnerability; the
likelihood or disposition of individuals to change into
a state of decreased ﬁtness when exposed to certain
conditions.
There are different ways in which extremely vulnerable
offspring are especially likely to proﬁt from parental
behavior with a small cost-beneﬁt ratio. For example, they
may proﬁt from their parents doing little more than simply
staying around and not harming them, thereby also dis-
couraging others who might be interested to do so (e.g.,
predators). Vulnerable offspring may also proﬁt from a
host of low-cost side-effects of parents’ concern with their
own self-preservation. For example, in gathering food for
themselves or in self-protection, parents may simulta-
neously supply food or protection to offspring. These
examples suggest that, if an effective mechanism for
other-beneﬁting is to evolve, it may sometimes have to
work together with mechanisms involved in self-preser-
vation (e.g., in aggressively defending offspring) and
sometimes to compete with them (e.g., self-protection may
be more urgent than helping others).
However, in the context of a relatively stable attachment
between parents and offspring, and via a process of mutual
adaptation or evolutionary arms races (Dawkins and Krebs
1979), parental mechanisms may evolve that are increas-
ingly responsive to speciﬁc changes in the ﬁtness or well-
being of offspring. For instance, if some parents are
inclined to do a little more than staying around (e.g., more
actively scare away predators, bring more food back than
can be consumed alone and leave it for offspring to con-
sume), they would have an advantage in terms of inclusive
ﬁtness. Complementarily, if some newborns would manage
to trigger these new mechanisms more effectively than
others (e.g., by wandering away and alerting predators, by
begging for food), their inclusive ﬁtness would also
increase. In turn, parents will make their care more effec-
tive (e.g., prevent the offspring from wandering from the
nest, regular provision food), while offspring become more
proﬁcient in soliciting care (Kilner and Johnstone 1997).
As outlined in an earlier section, the brain can adaptively
and effectively respond to ﬁtness-relevant properties such
as the vulnerability of offspring by responding in a reactive
and relatively unconditional manner to sensory input cor-
related with vulnerability. Second, ‘‘motivated’’ by these
reactive behavioral mechanisms, more advanced brains can
form increasingly accurate internal representations of an
object’s vulnerability. Finally, a capacity for symbolic
representation and symbol manipulation ensures that
parental care will be increasingly associated with particu-
larly low ﬁtness costs and high effectiveness or beneﬁts to
recipients. In addition to recognizing the mere physical
features of immaturity, this capacity allows for vulnerability
of offspring to be represented in multiple symbolic ways.
Vulnerability may, for example, be implied by a vulnerable
posture (e.g., lying on the ground), a particular situation
(e.g., a single individual confronted with an angry crowd),
or a social relationship in which individuals are dependent
on trust and mutual willingness to cooperate given strong
temptation and opportunity to harm each other or cheat (see
below). Complementarily, this capacity enables individuals
to imagine different behaviors that would be effective
in preventing harm or providing ﬁtness opportunities.
Improved intelligence also enables individuals to provide
care in a critical and punitive manner, preventing them from
being victimized by social parasites while continuing to
provide care in a timely and relatively unconditional man-
ner to those that urgently need it.
More speciﬁcally, mammalian parents probably were
the ﬁrst to experience many of the so-called moral
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123emotions that are currently being distinguished by psy-
chologists such as sympathy, guilt, or moral anger. As
explained below, these emotions can be conceived as
adaptive motivational states, tailored to speciﬁc changes in
ﬁtness of vulnerable offspring and their attributed causes,
allowing parents to ﬁne-tune their care to widely different
situations in terms of, for example, aggressive defense,
cleaning, healing, punishment, education, or simply tender
physical contact.
Individuals are also Selective in Choosing Recipients
of Beneﬁts
Effectiveness of helping does not exclude selectivity. The
contrary, the evolution of an effective mechanism for
parental care is based on extreme selectivity, ensuring that
parents primarily invest in the products of their own
reproductive efforts. As described in relation to Fig. 1,
selectivity is best described in terms of attitude formation
and functioning. That is, a strong activation of a parental
care system may result in a strong positive attitude and
attachment, which will bias the activation of the system on
subsequent occasions. Activation of self-preservational
mechanisms (e.g., because of nonreciprocation or other
harmful features of the recipient or situation) may result in
negative attitudes, exerting an inhibitory inﬂuence on
other-beneﬁting. This view is consistent with the well-
established facts in social psychology that we are espe-
cially likely to help positive attitude objects such as kin,
friends, or reciprocators (Korchmaros and Kenny 2006;
Penner et al. 2005) and refuse to help or punish negative
attitude objects such as disliked others or social parasites
(Miller et al. 2003).
It is important to note, however, that a too strong
emphasis on the role of selectivity and attitudes may have
obscured an important question about the nature of other-
beneﬁting behavior: What properties should a behavioral
mechanism have to generate relevant and effective other-
beneﬁting behavior that really makes a difference for the
other individual, whether one feels attached to this indi-
vidual or not?
On the Right Interpretation of Sympathy and Other
Moral Emotions
It has been argued (Dijker 2010) that the different moti-
vational states or emotions that mammalian (and especially
human) parents experience in relation to immature young,
can be conceived of as so-called moral emotions that all
depend on the activation of a parental care system by a
vulnerable object (which then changes into an object of
care), together with activation of systems involved in
aggression and fear. In particular, these emotions are
adaptive motivational states, tailored to speciﬁc changes in
ﬁtness of vulnerable offspring and their attributed causes,
allowing parents to ﬁne-tune their care to widely different
situations. For example, moral anger is caused by the
perception that a third party threatens the ﬁtness of the care
object and results in aggressive defense and punishment;
sympathy is caused by the perception that the ﬁtness of the
care object has actually decreased but that a responsible
agent is absent or irrelevant, resulting in comforting and
healing of the object. Dependent on the attributed cause of
the change in ﬁtness, aggression may also be directed at the
object itself (to induce better self-care) or the self, thus
resulting in guilt (Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009). Once
again this illustrates the point that, in order to produce
effective outcomes, a mechanism speciﬁcally designed for
other-beneﬁting has to act together with mechanisms
involved in self-preservation. Below, it will be argued that
this advanced system of emotions may be exapted for
reciprocity and cooperation among not particularly vul-
nerable or needy adult strangers. Although generally
acknowledging that many moral emotions are based on
care, other theories of moral emotions (for reviews, see
Haidt 2003; Tangney et al. 2007) are less clear about the
underlying psychological mechanisms.
Here, this theory of moral emotions is used to solve an
urgent problem in the psychological explanation of emo-
tions that motivate helping behavior in a rather altruistic
manner and which have been variously termed sympathy,
pity,o rempathy. Darwin (1872/1998, p. 215) found it
relatively self-evident that sympathy is commonly felt in
response to the suffering of those that we feel attached to
(positive attitude objects), but struggled with sympathy felt
for total strangers. An inﬂuential solution to this problem,
proposed by psychologists (e.g., Batson 1987; Preston and
de Waal 2002), is to assume that especially humans are
capable of taking the perspective of needy individuals and
that this would trigger the emotion of sympathy and a
tendency to help; even in the absence of attachments or
positive attitudes. (This is the reason why empathy often is
seen as an emotion and equated with sympathy.) This
account fails, however, to explain why, in taking the oth-
er’s perspective, we care about improving the other’s sit-
uation and spend much energy and time to do so (Wispe ´
1991). Here, it is proposed that the parental care mecha-
nism not only is the main determinant of sympathy with
suffering individuals but also of a general tenderness and
softness in response to others who do not (yet) suffer but
are vulnerable and ﬁt (e.g., a smiling, active, and curious
infant). Sympathy is a motivational state in which tender-
ness combines with the distress felt when observing an
actual decrease in ﬁtness of the vulnerable care object
(Dijker 2001, 2010; McDougall 1908/1948), and should
not be confused with empathy. It is a state automatically
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an inability to attribute harm to external causes. Yet, per-
spective taking may help potential benefactors to better
understand the nature of the other’s need and the behav-
ioral alternatives for improving the needy individual’s
situation.
The parental care system may not only be responsible
for a wide variety of moral emotions but also for social
qualities that have been termed tolerance, patience, and
gentleness, and which may also play an important role in
symmetrical cooperation (see below). Importantly, these
qualities and the care-based moral emotions may become
less visible in individuals and groups in which self-pre-
servational mechanisms inhibit the activation of a care
mechanism. These individuals and groups are more likely
to morally respond on the basis of fear, aggression, sub-
mission to dominant others, and shame (for a discussion of
differences between shame and guilt, see Tangney et al.
2007).
Individual, Group, and Contextual Differences
in Helping
The extent to which motivational systems associated with
self-preservation and other-beneﬁting can inﬂuence social
behavior depends on the relative ease with which these
mechanisms can be activated in individuals, species, and
societies. That is, some individuals, species, or societies are
more likely to interact on the basis of a strongly activated
care system, whereas others regulate social interaction
primarily on the basis of a strongly activated system
responsible for fear and aggression and likely responsible
for punishment, obedience, and public shaming or stig-
matization. This implies that one should be careful not to
draw conclusions about the psychological mechanisms that
would be responsible for cooperation on the basis of
observations made on a single group or culture.
With respect to individual differences in helping
behavior in mammals, one would ﬁrst of all expect sex
differences. In particular, in mammals, females are more
likely to have a stronger developed and more easily acti-
vated care system, and less developed ﬁght-or-ﬂight sys-
tem, than men. In humans, men are not only less nurturant
(e.g., Costa et al. 2001) but also less likely to adopt an ethic
of care than justice (e.g., Jaffee and Hyde 2000; Skoe et al.
2002), and respond with more anger and punishment to
offenders of norm violations (e.g., Gault and Sabini 2000)
than women.
In humans, individual differences in care and self-
preservation also express themselves in a wide variety of
personality characteristics relevant for social behavior. For
example, people high in authoritarianism or conservatism
show a tendency to fearfully submit to powerful others, and
to aggress or show contempt to those who are disobedient
and violate norms (Altemeyer 1998). In contrast, liberalism
or egalitarianism is associated with a morality of care and
greater ‘‘softness’’ in responding to deviance, expressing
itself, for example, in greater sympathy with needy or
disadvantaged others (for a review, see Dijker and Koomen
2007). In making moral judgments, liberals ﬁnd notions of
care and reciprocity more important than of obedience and
ingroup loyalty, while increasing conservatism is associ-
ated with a decrease in relevance of the former two but an
increase in relevance of the latter two moralities (Haidt
2007).
Societies or cultures can be seen as sets of stimuli that
exert a chronic (priming) inﬂuence on the different mech-
anisms involved in cooperation. In particular, human
societies in which the care system is chronically activated
can be associated with an egalitarian, and societies in
which the ﬁght-or-ﬂight system is chronically activated,
with a hierarchical social organization (often accompanied
with a reproductive system based on male dominance). In
combination with collectivism and small group size, the
former societies are known to be relatively communal,
peaceful, forgiving, and lacking in intergroup conﬂict; the
latter (especially in combination with larger group size and
greater complexity) as more punitive, stigmatizing, and
engaging in intergroup conﬂict (Boehm 1999; Hofstede
2001; Knauft 1991; for discussions, see Dijker and
Koomen 2007).
An egalitarian social structure has returned in modern
Western society, yet this time in combination with strong
individualism, division of labor, and trade (Inglehart and
Baker 2000), and a variety of institutions and strategies to
suppress negative behavior toward a wide array of deviant
characteristics of interaction partners (Dijker and Koomen
2007).
Finally, we should expect that relatively temporary cir-
cumstances also inﬂuence the likelihood with which social
life and cooperation in particular will be inﬂuenced by
mechanisms associated with other-beneﬁting and self-
preservation. For example, war, famine, or plagues will
strongly activate the mechanisms involved in self-preser-
vation, thereby resulting in relatively distrustful and puni-
tive kinds of social interaction.
Implications for Explaining Cooperation: Towards
a Classiﬁcation in Terms of Psychological Mechanisms
The search for adaptive mechanisms underlying coopera-
tion has been strongly determined by a tendency to ﬁrst
make a distinction between mechanisms involved in
obtaining indirect and direct ﬁtness beneﬁts, and then try-
ing to classify the different mechanisms within these broad
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123categories. Direct beneﬁts refer to beneﬁts obtained by
benefactors during their lifetimes, whereas indirect beneﬁts
refer to beneﬁts to genetically related recipients; i.e., ben-
eﬁts that increase the inclusive ﬁtness of benefactors but
typicaly imply ﬁtness costs that are not compensated dur-
ing the benefactors’ lifetimes (Hamilton 1964; Trivers
1971; West et al. 2007). Research on psychological
mechanisms involved in obtaining indirect ﬁtness beneﬁts
have usually been restricted to mechanisms for determining
the degree of genetic relatedness between benefactors and
potential recipients of beneﬁts. One can be sure, however,
that theorists interested in kin-directed other-beneﬁting
often have asymmetrical helping behavior in mind, like
feeding starving, or defending vulnerable kin; and that they
would agree that this behavior requires ‘‘speciﬁc design’’ in
order to be effective.
In contrast, the behaviors thought to be involved in
obtaining direct beneﬁts are much more divers, motivating
theorists to construct increasingly ﬁne-grained classiﬁca-
tions in terms of, for example, reciprocity, pseudoreci-
procity, indirect reciprocity, or by-product mutualism
(Bergmu ¨ller et al. 2007; Lehmann and Keller 2006; Nowak
2006; Stevens et al. 2005; West et al. 2007). Yet, it is not
always clear to what extent these classes refer to unique or
common mechanisms, keeping the true sense of psycho-
logical mechanism in mind. Most importantly, it is not
clear if mechanisms involved in obtaining indirect beneﬁts
may also be involved in obtaining direct beneﬁts and vice
versa.
In the present paper, the classiﬁcation of other-beneﬁting
behaviors that will be proposed is unambiguously in terms
of true behavioral or psychological mechanisms. Speciﬁ-
cally, these behaviors will be attributed to mechanisms that,
in principle, can be speciﬁed in terms of underlying brain
mechanisms for connecting sensory input to motor output,
and to discrete physical and ﬁtness-relevant properties of
other individuals and the common environment; properties
associated with sensory cues that can activate mechanisms.
Because this description of a mechanism establishes a
lawful connection between perceptual input and motor
output, its explanatory use qualiﬁes as a causal explanation
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bunge and Ardilla 1987).
The goal of the classiﬁcation is to differentiate psy-
chological mechanisms, to examine how they may be
combined, and, to understand how a psychological mech-
anism for unconditional helping may improve symmetrical
cooperation. No attempt will be made to determine for
speciﬁc other-beneﬁting behaviors whether they represent
(indirect) reciprocity, pseudoreciprocity, or by-product
mutualism. Instead, it is proposed that one should ﬁrst be
clear about the basic psychological mechanisms that ani-
mals have at their disposal before one attempts to assign
other-beneﬁting behaviors to these classes. Interpretation
problems repeatedly occurring in previous classiﬁcation
attempts (e.g., whether previous examples of reciprocity
should be better considered pseudoreciprocity or whether
reciprocal interactions are really based on cost-beneﬁt
calculations or on attitudes) indicate that an analysis in
terms of true mechanisms and their ﬂexible combination is
urgently needed.
Classiﬁcation of Other-Beneﬁting Behaviors
Figure 2 distinguishes three main classes of other-beneﬁt-
ing behaviors. At the far left, bottom row, two mechanisms
are listed that are activated and partially controlled by the
recipient of the beneﬁts. Helping is asymmetrical other-
beneﬁting in the sense that it is caused by the recipient’s
condition and/or the active soliciting of help; on the basis
of a sensorimotor and motivational mechanism in the
benefactor that establishes a lawful connection between
perceptual input and motor output. As suggested above, the
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Fig. 2 A classiﬁcation of other-
beneﬁting behaviors in terms of
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123responsible psychological mechanism most likely origi-
nates from the evolution of parental care.
As will become clear later, it is useful to distinguish
asymmetrical helping in species in which behavior is lar-
gely produced by reactive sensorimotor mechanisms, and
in species in which individuals are relatively autonomous
and behavior is produced with much more mediation by
internal representation and mental processing. Ants would
be a good example of the former species and it may be
speculated that their ‘‘cooperation’’ almost entirely is based
on reactively produced helping responses to the perceived
vulnerability and needs of others, resulting in a ‘‘super
organism’’. In particular, in most members of an ant soci-
ety, other-beneﬁting prevails over self-preservation and
reproduction as (dependent on their particular role) these
members engage in behavior such as caring for the young,
self-sacriﬁcial defense, carrying siblings, and offering
themselves as living instruments or components for the con-
struction of nests, bridges or ﬂoating devices (Ho ¨lldobler
and Wilson 1990). The fact that the queen is cared for by
her offspring does not contradict the present interpretation
that most ant cooperation may be derived from kin-directed
parental care if it assumed that she triggers care by emitting
cues that are correlated with her vulnerability and chronic
dependency on her offspring.
While helping behavior in highly autonomous agents
such as humans may still depend on a reactive parental care
mechanism, its effects are likely to depend much more on
competition with self-preservational mechanisms and the
enormous mental capacity to trigger these mechanisms and
to think about ways to satisfy them. However, the combi-
nation of a strong care mechanism and mental capacity in
humans may also be responsible for the probably uniquely
human property of conscience, enabling the extensive
cooperation in autonomous individuals (see later).
The relatively unconditional nature of a mechanism for
helping is most clearly suggested by the existence of
interspeciﬁc parasitism. For example, Trivers (1985,
pp. 50–51) describes how beetles of Atemelis pubicollis try
to get the attention of ants of Myrmica laevinodis by tap-
ping them on their mouth parts with their antennae and
front legs (behavior which can be interpreted as begging),
resulting in the ant regurgating food. A more familiar
example would be the tendency of some birds to make use
of the parental care mechanism of other birds by laying
their eggs in the latter’s nests.
Yet, another form of asymmetrical other-beneﬁting
occurs when the recipient has the power to harm or punish
the benefactor, thus causing the benefactor to provide
beneﬁts in order to avoid punishment (Clutton-Brock and
Parker 1995). The main responsible mechanism would be
the one involved in escape and aggression. For example,
dominant individuals may suggest (e.g., through increasing
in size or aggressive displays) to submissive individuals
that they have the potential to physically harm them,
whereas the latter may suggest (e.g., through making
themselves small or delivering the demanded goods or
services) that they are harmless and even ready to escape. It
is interesting to note that parents may employ asymmetrical
helping and power simultaneously to effectively beneﬁt
their children (for a discussion of parental styles in pri-
mates, see Maestripieri 1999).
A second major class of other-beneﬁting behaviors
shown in Fig. 2 includes symmetrical or reciprocal social
behavior, with individuals engaged in a process in which
they provide beneﬁts to each other. In one subclass, indi-
viduals respond to each others’ needs and are essentially
engaged in helping or need reduction; in the other, they
provide unsolicited ﬁtness opportunities to others and may
even create needs in others. The ﬁrst subclass is discussed
by Trivers (1971) in terms of reciprocal altruism. Although
often not made explicit, Trivers starts from the assumption
that mechanisms for beneﬁting needy others in relatively
unconditional ways are already in place before reciprocity
can evolve. This is clear from examples like ‘‘helping in
times of danger [e.g., accidents]’’ and ‘‘helping the sick, the
wounded, or the very young and old’’ (1971, p. 45). It is
also evident from his examples that effective helping often
is crucially dependent on the willingness of the donor to
immediately and without hesitance engage in quite risky
behavior. Finally, Trivers suggests a competition between
unconditional helping and aggressive tendencies by noting
that anger is not only necessary to punish and discourage
cheaters, but also to inhibit strong and indiscriminate
helping tendencies that are associated with the experienced
pleasure of helping others (1971, p. 49). It must be noted
that there is remarkably little evidence for the existence of
reciprocity in nonhuman animals (Clutton-Brock 2009;
Hammerstein 2003a). It is safe, however, to conclude that
in humans, reciprocity is considered a major value given
the importance attached to norms prescribing it (Gouldner
1960) and the function of gratitude (McCullough et al.
2001; Trivers 1971).
A parsimonious way to conceive of a psychological
mechanism that allows individuals to temper their rela-
tively unconditional helping tendency is to assume that this
tendency can compete with an independently functioning
aggression system that is also responsible for the formation
of conditioned negative attitudes towards social parasites
(Stijnen and Dijker in press).
A second subcategory of symmetrical other-beneﬁting
involves the mutual provisioning of beneﬁts not caused by
the perception of others’ needs but by an expected return
beneﬁt. By making available a ﬁtness opportunity to others,
the benefactor simultaneously takes the opportunity to
consume a ﬁtness beneﬁt made available by the recipient,
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123situation, or bystanders. For example, ﬂowers may
exchange their attractive nectar with insects or birds for
opportunities to transport their pollen to other ﬂowers (for
other examples, see Clutton-Brock 2009; Connor 1995).
Providing beneﬁts to a recipient to obtain return beneﬁts
from bystanders, termed indirect reciprocity or social
prestige, falls in the same subcategory.
A tremendously important new possibility for mutual-
ism is born when individuals are capable of intentionally
producing surplus goods or services at relatively low costs,
to be exchanged with others who intentionally produce
different surplus goods or services. Why not catch at rel-
atively little additional costs several more prey animals,
make several more arrow heads, or cook dinner for two
instead of one, if you can trade these surplus products for
goods and services that are currently more useful to you? A
famous description of this trading process, primarily gui-
ded by self-preservational motives, and assumed to be the
basis of human division of labor and economic growth, was
offered by Adam Smith (1776/1910). Thus in order to
obtain others’ goods or services, ‘‘[Man] will be more
likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor
and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for
him what he requires of them’’ (Smith 1776/1910, p. 13).
In psychological terms, this process can be described as
the mutual rewarding of each others’ behavior by means of
operant conditioning; with the behavior not speciﬁcally
directed at improving others’ ﬁtness but simply performed
to obtain rewards.
The third major class of other-beneﬁting behavior in
Fig. 2 is caused by common environmental properties that
activate a self-preservational or reproductive mechanism
present in the different individuals involved. Important
reasons for individuals to ﬂock, herd, or school is that this
allows them to decrease the likelihood of becoming tar-
geted by a predator, increase the likelihood of obtaining
food or mates, or safely give birth (Hamilton 1971; Wilson
1980). Note that in explaining herding, individuals are not
expected to speciﬁcally provide costly goods or services to
others; they simply are assumed to want to be in each
others’ presence to obtain beneﬁts from herding. The
common goal of safety or obtaining food is realized by
members of the herd independently directing their behavior
at the same environmental properties such as the presence
of a predator.
Cooperation in the narrow sense of working together is
another subclass of other-beneﬁting caused by common
ﬁtness threats or opportunities that activate mechanisms
associated with self-preservation such as feeding, escape,
or aggressive defense. However, unlike the former sub-
class, cooperation in the narrow sense is additionally
caused by active communication, coordination, and role
differentiation (Noe ¨ 2006). Typically, individuals engage
in this sort of activity because they cannot realize the
endstate on their own and hence need the contribution of
others to obtain it. This process can also be described as
synergy (Alvard 2001; Maynard Smith and Szathmary
1995). Hunting down prey animals too big to catch on
one’s own would be a good example, with different indi-
viduals being responsible for different tasks (Packer and
Ruttan 1988). Thus cooperation in the narrow sense differs
from helping in that the other individual’s need state is not
a sufﬁcient cause for the coordinated activity to take place.
(In fact, a serious need state would make it difﬁcult for
individuals to effectively contribute to obtaining a common
goal.) This makes it also different from Trivers’ reciprocal
altruism according to which truly asymmetrical helping
takes place repeatedly. (Unfortunately, many later refer-
ences to Trivers (1971) do not clearly distinguish recipro-
cal helping from cooperation in the narrow sense and from
exchange among not particularly needy individuals.)
Another important aspect of this kind of mutualism is
that it often does not make sense for interaction partners to
‘‘cheat’’ or contribute less than the other, as it may be
physically impossible to realize the common goal without a
speciﬁc distribution of individual efforts (Clutton-Brock
2009; Leimar and Hammerstein 2010; Maynard Smith and
Szathmary 1995). This may also hold for exchange or
trade, when individuals have to use each other reciprocally
as instruments to realize self-preservational goals.
The present classiﬁcation suggests that different psy-
chological mechanisms may be combined to make coop-
eration in the narrow sense increasingly effective. Consider
the following possibilities. The environment may function
as a common cause for cooperation, for example, by pre-
senting predators or prey to a group of individuals. When
the relevant mechanism for self-preservation is activated in
these individuals, they will collectively orient towards the
predator or prey, resulting in collective defense or hunting,
respectively. While this may initially merely involve a kind
of imitative defense or imitative foraging (Wilson 1980), it
may increasingly make use of communication between
individuals. In particular, in collectively trying to realize
the common goal, individuals may (a) communicate tem-
porary need states and solicit assistance to perform the
tasks associated with their role well (helping), (b) force
others to obey instructions (power), and (c) provision and
exchange unsolicited services and goods, thereby pre-
venting future need states and drop-out of cooperators.
Improving Cooperation with Asymmetrical (Parental)
Care
For different reasons, cooperation among individuals
endowedwithbrainmechanismsforrelativelyunconditional
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123and asymmetrical (parental) care can be considerably
improved. First, cooperation may be almost entirely con-
trolled by mutually activating reactive mechanisms derived
fromparentalcare,asisperhapstrueforeusocialinsectssuch
as ants.
Second, when individuals are temporarily incapable of
working together with others due to injury or illness, it pays
to allow them to get better or to actively attempt to heal
them. In all human societies, a caring tendency has devel-
oped into an elaborate system of healing and medicine,
together with a set of normative prescriptions to prevent
social parasitism, known as the sick role (Fa ´brega 1997;
Parsons 1951). The underlying motivation is apparently so
strong that it also has resulted in a variety of institutions for
specialized care for the permanently ill or disabled.
Third, to make symmetrical cooperation and reciprocity
on the basis of self-preservation especially successful, those
involved may have to ‘‘do something extra’’, without suf-
ﬁcient evidence for obtaining return beneﬁts. In particular,
it would be unwise to immediately stop interacting after
observing that the other stays behind in contributing to a
common goal. It may even be important to start behaving
nicely to others without any evidence that the other will be
nice too. It is argued here that properties such as patience,
tolerance, and forgiveness are associated with a strongly
developed care system and that such a system provides a
plausible mechanistic explanation for a tit-for-tat strategy in
a repeated prisoner’ dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).
Finally, if individuals are capable of symbolically rep-
resenting the social interdependencies involved in cooper-
ation, the care mechanism as sketched above may generate
a wide variety of moral emotions that help to sustain
cooperation during ‘‘critical moments’’, when there is both
temptation and opportunity to cheat. This may be what
research with the prisoner’s dilemma and other social
dilemma’s actually is about: Human subjects capable of
seeing and mentally representing the complete payoff
matrix of the particular game as a symbolic representation
of social interdependencies and vulnerabilities, and deriv-
ing their game behavior from a variety of emotional
reactions triggered by this representation. (It seems
doubtful if it makes sense to assume that species without
symbolic capacity can play this game in a similar sense.) In
particular, mentally representing the payoff matrix of the
prisoner’s dilemma implies that players are aware that both
the self and the other player are dependent on each other
(and ﬁnd themselves in a vulnerable position), especially in
the sense that both may be tempted to defect because this is
associated with the greatest individual beneﬁt. Especially
in making the ﬁrst move in the prisoner’s dilemma game,
one may more or less trust that the other will care about
one’s vulnerable position (for an interpretation of trust in
terms of vulnerability, see Rousseau et al. 1998).
Now, causing or imagining causing harm on vulnerable
beings (which are likely to activate the care system) is
responsible for a variety of moral emotions. Thus when trust
is broken, the other player’s defection and its resulting
unequal distribution of valuable goods, may arouse moral
anger, whereas defection by the self may induce guilt.
Importantly, in imagining or anticipating these outcomes,
similar emotions may be aroused, of which especially guilt
would be an important motivator to prevent causing harm
on the vulnerable other (Nelissen et al. 2007). In case of the
other’s defection, pity or forgiveness may also be aroused,
especially if the defection can be attributed to external
causes beyond the individual’s control such as illness
(Batson and Ahmad 2001) or noise (Van Lange et al. 2002).
The fact that nasal administration of oxytocin, the hormone
which is typically associated with activity of the parental
care system (Panksepp 1998; Uvna ¨s-Moberg 1998),
increases trust and fair behavior in public good games that
are related to the prisoner’s dilemma (Kosfeld et al. 2005),
also seems to support an interpretation of cooperative
behavior in terms of an activated (parental) care mechanism
(on neurophysiological evidence for the presence of a
parental care system in mammals, including humans, and its
interaction and competition with a self-preservational ﬁght-
or-ﬂight system, see Kirsch et al. 2005; Panksepp 1998;
Uvna ¨s-Moberg 1998). Involvement of the parental care
mechanism is further suggested by demonstrations that
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma or similar social
dilemma’s is positively inﬂuenced by exposure to physical
cues associated with infants and care such as a smile or
touch (e.g., Boone and Buck 2003; Mehu et al. 2007).
Similar explanations may be used to understand behavior
in the ultimatum game, often used by economists to study
other-beneﬁting,inwhichonepersonisaskedtodivideasum
ofmoney(suppliedbytheexperimenter)betweenhimorher
andanotherperson(forareview,seeSigmundetal.2002).It
has been observed in many different cultures that the
majority of players behave in a costly manner; they share
close to 50%, and do not accept offers lower than 20%. In
termsofthepresenttheorythisbehaviorcanbeexplainedby
assuming that money supplied to one of the players is not
‘‘owned’’ yet by anyone of the players,which means that the
one who is allowed to distribute it may imagine to cause a
relative need state in the (vulnerable) other player by not
givinghalfofittohimorher;subsequentlyresultinginmoral
emotions such as sympathy or guilt.
The Evolution of a Uniquely Human Capacity
for Cooperation
In the previous sections, it was suggested that humans are
endowed with a psychological mechanism that not only
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of needy individuals but also provides a background
‘‘softness’’ or gentleness that is needed for social properties
that can be described as tolerance, patience, forgiveness,
doing something extra, and moral emotions, and which
seem essential to make symmetrical cooperation among
highly autonomous individuals a success. Yet, this softness
may be less visible in hierarchically organized societies or
under conditions in which self-preservational motives are
strongly activated. It was proposed that the underlying
mechanism bears all the marks of a mammalian parental
care system acting together with self-preservational
mechanisms, yet integrated with a capacity for symbolic
representation and reasoning. This section brieﬂy specu-
lates about the evolutionary processes in humans that
have led to its generalization beyond parent-offspring
relationships.
First note that especially theorists adopting the pris-
oner’s dilemma as the main paradigm for explaining the
evolution of cooperation (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1992;
Trivers 1971), would argue that a mechanism with a rela-
tively unconditional and indiscriminate care element may
not evolve at all in an environment in which at least some
individuals are likely to misuse it and cheat. In responding
to this objection, it is important to recognize that a social
relationship or group to a certain extent can bear the
occurrence of social parasitism or cheating. Although the
psychological mechanism proposed in this paper automat-
ically generates unconditional care when needed, it also
allows individuals to be critical and selective toward others
and to take into account self-preservational concerns.
Social parasites will ﬁrst be punished in the relatively
tolerant and soft manner typical for mammalian parents,
yet will receive more aggression as evidence increases that
they have matured sufﬁciently and can stand on their own
feet (see Trivers 1974, on parent-offspring conﬂict). Such a
view is consistent with Axelrod and Hamilton’ (1981)
interpretation of the emergence of cooperation among
nonkin in the prisoner’s dilemma game, arguing that it can
generalize to nonkin after it has ﬁrst been ﬁrmly estab-
lished among kin.
The following reasons may be mentioned for expecting
the genes for an exceptionally strong or easily activated
parental care mechanism to be generally present in the
human population. First, bipedality in humans is associated
with a reduced size of the birth channel, and hence giving
birth to altricial babies that require an exceptionally strong
maternal motivation to engage in protection and nurtur-
ance, sustained during an extraordinarily long period of
immaturity.
Second, despite the extensive care and delays in repro-
duction demanded by human infants, inclusive ﬁtness may
have increased by human parents starting to select or
‘‘breed’’ offspring in which mutations caused the parental
care mechanism to get active before sexual maturity; thus
also allowing immature siblings to respond with care to
each others’ needs and suffering (for a similar suggestion,
see Dawkins 1976/1989, p. 281). This would free parents
to engage in other activities associated with self-preser-
vation and reproduction and would result in mature off-
spring that would be well prepared for providing similarly
effective long-term care to their own offspring, and so on.
The presence of an easily activated parental care mech-
anism in human children is suggested by children’s nur-
turing and helping responses to vulnerable (‘‘cute’’) things
such as younger siblings, animals, and dolls (Fogel et al.
1986; Hrdy 2009; Warneken and Tomasello 2009), and
the occurrence of moral emotions and corresponding
behavior in early childhood (Eisenberg 2000). Impor-
tantly, human infants also show relatively unconditional
and indiscriminate helping tendencies toward strange
adults in need, and only later start to discriminate on the
basis of group membership and reciprocity (Warneken
and Tomasello 2009). That a mechanism for parental care
may be involved in helping among adults is suggested by
the fact that the cues that can trigger prosocial behavior
often tend to be associated with the craniofacial features
of neonates and toddlers, even when present in adult faces
(Berry and McArthur 1986; Keating et al. 2003; Lorenz
1943).
The result of generally present genes for a parental care
mechanism would be a society in which all members have
the psychological capacity (in some individuals more
strongly developed than in others, and sensitive to con-
textual and cultural inﬂuences) for both asymmetrical
helping and symmetrical cooperation. The present theory
also suggests a motivational and moral mechanism for
cooperative breeding, which until now has been largely
interpreted in terms of cognitive aspects (Burkart and van
Schaik 2010). Perhaps, group selection plays an additional
role in the evolution of relatively indiscriminate altruism
toward ingroup members (e.g., Sober and Wilson 1998).
Finally note how a combination of a strongly activated
parental care mechanism and uniquely human intelligence
complements the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar 2003;
Humphrey 1976) which states that, in primates, brain size
and associated intelligence have primarily increased in the
service of ‘‘Machiavellian intelligence’’. This kind of
intelligence may indeed be characteristic for a hierarchi-
cally organized and perhaps male-dominated society or
under strong competition. Yet, caregivers, whether they be
parents, young children, or cooperating strangers, must
employ a different kind of intelligence also requiring an
increased brain size; one that allows them to engage
effectively in the many tasks necessary to care effectively
for vulnerable others.
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The physical and mechanistic constraints on social
behavior uncovered in this paper cannot easily come to the
fore when primarily adopting a game-theoretical perspec-
tive on social interaction. As argued, these constraints
reveal themselves ﬁrst when it is recognized that, in order
to produce adaptive behavior, behavioral mechanisms in
general have to be based on accurate perception and
internal representation of the physical properties of other
individuals and the environment in which they live. Some
species manage to respond adaptively primarily on the
basis of reactive mechanisms, others may complement
reactivity with accurate internal representation of, and even
reasoning about, invariant properties.
The most important results of this mechanistic analysis
can be summarized as follows. There are two broad classes
of behaviors involved in providing beneﬁts to others:
Helping and cooperation. Adopting this classiﬁcation has
allowed us to identify a speciﬁcally designed psychological
mechanism for effective asymmetrical other-beneﬁting,
explaining in a mechanistic sense the existence of
‘‘unconditional kindness’’ and a variety of moral emotions
in response to perceived vulnerability. This classiﬁcation
has also allowed us to distinguish a limited number of
mechanisms associated with self-preservation that are
involved in cooperation. Yet, this distinction has also made
it possible to recognize that the mechanisms involved in
helping and cooperation may act together; in such a way
that highly autonomous agents such as humans experience
sufﬁcient motivation to conscientiously continue to coop-
erate during critical moments.
In light of a game-theoretical perspective, where
choosing a particular row or column of a payoff matrix has
unclear physical correlates, it is difﬁcult to obtain these
insights; a marriage between game theory and traditional
cognitive psychology makes it even more difﬁcult. In
particular, an emphasis on symbolic representation and
reasoning makes it difﬁcult to account for properties of
psychological mechanisms such as reactivity; variation in
intensity of sensory stimulation, motivation, and motor
output; competition and mutual inhibition between differ-
ent mechanisms; and accurate internal representation of
object properties in terms of sensorimotor networks with-
out the use of symbols.
This present critique of game theory, however, is not
meant to replace it. One interesting connection between
game theory and the present approach is that a game and its
payoff matrix can be conceived as a symbolic representa-
tion of social interdependencies that can be mentally rep-
resented by certain species. In this way, one can study how
emotional reactions to such a mental representation and
conscience in general can motivate players to make
cooperative choices. Interestingly, the use of games by
psychologists and economists once in a while reveals how
the presently proposed mechanism for other-beneﬁting may
be involved in actual game playing (see the effects of
certain nonverbal expressions and oxytocin on cooperative
choices, discussed earlier).
In light of the present emphasis on physical and mech-
anistic constraints on the evolution of cooperation, it may
be proposed that multi-agent modeling rather than game
theory is currently the most promising research paradigm
for studying it. In particular, multi-agent modeling allows
researchers to endow agents in a realistic way with multiple
psychological mechanisms that are triggered by speciﬁc
features and behaviors of other agents or their common
environment, and to vary the activation thresholds of these
mechanisms (Epstein and Axtell 1996). A relevant example
would be a simulation by Cesta, Miceli, and Rizzo (1996),
showing that simple agents that unconditionally help others
that beg for food and parasitize on helpful others (i.e., do
not look for food themselves when needy), can survive and
remain phenotypically dominant in a population as long as
they do not provide help when their own need for food
exceeds a critical value. These phenomena cannot be made
visible and explained by treating organisms as nonphysical
players in a game-theoretical approach to cooperation.
They remind us that evolutionary explanations for other-
beneﬁting behavior should respect physical limitations
and possibilities in designing and constructing adaptive
behavioral mechanisms.
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